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Ethos for (In)Justice 
“I believe in the brotherhood of all men, but I don't believe in wasting brotherhood on 
anyone who doesn't want to practice it with me. Brotherhood is a two-way street”. 
Malcolm X 
What justice demands of individuals in ideal circumstances is different to the form those 
demands will take in non-ideal circumstances. Where we have an institutional background 
organised according to principles described as just, citizens’ appropriate motivations and 
behaviours will set about supporting and stabilising this situation in order to ensure its 
continuity. However, when the institutional background does not conform to such principles, 
such stabilising behaviour will not produce the same (just) consequences. Indeed, if 
everyone’s behaviour merely stabilised a situation characterised by substantial injustice 
then that injustice would continue indefinitely. As a consequence, in non-ideal 
circumstances in order to behave justly individuals will have to respond to a different set of 
motives and adopt a different kind of ethos than that which would be suitable to a situation 
absent injustice.  
 There exist possible tensions and oppositions between the demands made of 
individuals in non-ideal circumstances and demands as they would appear in ideal 
circumstances. Individuals who come together to resist what they perceive as injustice may 
be permitted to withdraw from and disrupt productive practices; to break laws they 
consider unjust and confine their obligations, reciprocal actions and justifications for their 
actions, to a smaller set of people defined and united by common opposition to injustice 
and its perpetrators. While this kind of disruption and adversarial behaviour will be 
inappropriate in a situation that is fully just, it becomes both appropriate and necessary so 
long as (at least) substantial injustice remains. 
 I begin the essay by developing an account of the kinds of actions, decisions and 
behaviours that comply with principles of justice within ideal conditions. In so doing, I draw 
on G.A. Cohen’s notion of an ‘ethos’ to expand on and clarify John Rawls’ appeal to 
individuals’ ‘sense of justice’ and the associated notion that citizens should ‘act from’ 
principles of justice. Although there are important and fundamental differences between 
the thought of these two thinkers, there nevertheless remains the possibility for a dialogue 
between them that can help clarify the contributions and limitations of the other. 
 As an aspect of this dialogue I use Cohen’s idea of a ‘justificatory community’ to 
specify what constitutes both ideal and non-ideal conditions. We describe people as just 
when their actions are constrained by demands made of them by a community to which 
they owe justification for those actions. When individuals act contrary to such demands 
then they act unjustly and, moreover, contribute toward a situation of injustice. However, 
precisely because of the presence of these individuals – and groups of individuals – who are 
not suitably motivated to follow the constraints imposed on them by membership to a 
justificatory community, the ethos appropriate to ideal conditions is no longer applicable: It 
must change to accommodate the presence of – and react to – that second class of 
individuals.  
 I end the essay by tracing the different aspects of an ethos suited to non-ideal 
conditions. Rawls alludes to the costs of ‘assistance’ in bringing about just institutions 
without providing adequate detail as to the content or extent of those costs. In developing 
this alternative ethos I draw on a particular account of political solidarity to provide some 
sense of these costs. These costs are incurred in the creation of oppositional political 
associations, the members of which are, in light of continuing injustices produced by those 
individuals and groups acting ‘out of community’ with relevant others, permitted the 
disruption of institutions, infrastructure and various other practices that contribute to the 
production and sustaining of injustice.  
   Compliance and Assistance 
There has been a great deal of discussion about the appropriate ‘site’ of justice. When we 
talk about justice with which part of the world should we concern ourselves: Is justice 
limited to a description of the principles which organise background institutional structures, 
from our parliaments to our tax codes, from our labour markets to our education system? 
Or is justice also a description of the kinds of behaviours, attitudes and characteristics of the 
citizens who occupy a just society?  
At some level the above distinction is an obviously exaggerated one. A government 
could establish a fully just set of institutions which a majority – or even a minority – of its 
citizens reject so thoroughly that they exit that society and in so doing undercut the 
practicability of those institutions. There will always need to be some minimum level of 
citizen identification with the institutional background in order for the principles that inform 
and shape that background to function at all, even if that minimum level simply describes 
mere passive acquiescence – in light of the costs of exit – rather than an active and whole-
hearted embrace. No set of institutions, however just, will last long if the citizens they are 
supposed to organize vote them out of existence or simply leave them behind to live 
elsewhere.1 What Rawls calls the ‘basic structure’ may be that which secures ‘background 
justice’ but it does not do so distinct from the behaviours and attitudes of the citizens 
whose lives are framed by that background. The level of the individual interactions, i.e. the 
relationships, behaviours and actions of citizens, as conditioned by a just basic structure is 
thus a necessary part of justice. 
 The separate question as to whether the institutional background is primary to the 
decisions, actions and attitudes of the citizens of the just society is one I can afford to 
bracket: Put idiomatically, whether the chicken came first or the egg came first, we need 
chickens if we want eggs and eggs if we want chickens. I can thus agree with Samuel 
Scheffler when he argues that individual behaviours remain a concern for those who wish to 
argue for the primacy of the institutional background when discussing matters that pertain 
to justice.2 Moreover, while Rawls himself is certainly amongst those who argue for the 
primacy of the basic structure, he nevertheless provides some resources to describe what 
kinds of attitudes and behaviours are suitable for citizens living under just institutions.  
  In Rawls’ account the behaviours and attitudes expected of citizens are significantly 
more substantial than the possibly grudging acquiescence and passive acceptance alluded to 
above. Against a just basic structure, individuals derive part of their motivations from what 
Rawls calls a ‘normally effective sense of justice’. This takes as its reference point the 
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principles of justice derived from the Rawlsian original position. While vague as to the actual 
details of how these principles might affect individuals’ decisions and behaviour, broadly 
speaking citizens of the just society will "act from the principles of justice in the ordinary 
course of events".3 This is more than mere compliance: Citizens will have their daily lives not 
only constrained by what these principles imply but, since they are to be acted ‘from’, such 
principles will also supply at least some of the motivation behind what they do and the 
choices they make.4 
For Rawls, the actions of appropriately motivated agents run as follows. First, they 
comply with the principles of justice in order to do their share in the sustaining of just 
institutions. Second, they are to ‘assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they 
do not exist, at least when this can be done with little cost’ to themselves.5 In essence then 
individuals are required to ‘do their part’ in both the sustaining and, when costs are not too 
high, establishment of just institutions. Under conditions of full compliance this is of course 
much easier – where we can be assured of everyone else complying with this couple of 
demands because all are similarly motivated to act justly, the cost to each individual is going 
to be relatively small.6 However, the possible differences between activities that are, for 
instance, suitable for ‘compliance’ but not ‘assistance’ is something that is not entirely clear.  
In what follows, I take ‘compliance’ and ‘assistance’ separately. Compliance is that 
which is appropriate to preserve an already just situation. Assistance on the other hand 
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allows for a certain distance between ideal and non-ideal circumstances: So long as the 
costs are not too great, individuals are, according to Rawls, obliged to help establish 
institutions that more fully correspond to the principles of justice. Fully just circumstances 
will have no need for this additional assistance since compliance will be enough: Our duties 
will flatten out to be of the preservative variety alone. However, as the distance between 
ideal and non-ideal increases, it becomes increasingly necessary to gain sense of the content 
and extent of this ‘assistance’, as well as its costs.   
This question of appropriate assistance will occupy the latter part of this paper. For 
now, I will draw on Cohen’s critique of Rawls to supplement and expand on the content of 
the demands of compliance. Cohen’s explication of the ‘egalitarian ethos’ is similar in intent, 
if not in extent, to the Rawlsian notion of a ‘normally effective sense of justice’: it specifies 
the kinds of constraints that will operate on the decisions and actions taken by individuals 
who are suitably motivated by the demands of justice.  
It is specifically with reference to what is involved in individuals ‘acting from’ the 
difference principle that exercises Cohen’s criticisms of Rawls. Cohen suggests that in 
situations where institutions are governed according to just principles, and assuming 
individuals really are motivated by justice, behaviour truly compliant to and embracing of 
those principles would not only operate at the level of the rules governing institutions but 
would, in line with Rawls’ own notion of an ‘effective sense of justice’, also impact at the 
level of individual behaviour. The issue is whether this ‘effective sense’ can be completed 
exclusively by Rawls’ formal stipulation that compliance issues in the requirement to vote 
for parties – and urge others to do the same – whose proposals come closest to conformity 
with the principles of justice.7 Is this to be the extent of our ‘sense of justice’ in ideal 
conditions? Are other decisions and actions to be released from any concern with what that 
‘sense’ might amount to? 
Such a limited ‘sense’ would justify a certain amount of social schizophrenia. A 
person could move to a constituency where their vote for the right government – the one 
that he believed would introduce proposals closest to the Rawlsian principles of justice – 
would have no chance of affecting the overall outcome. He could urge neighbours to follow 
him, safe in the knowledge that such cajoling will have little consequence. If nothing outside 
of these kinds of ‘official’ activity are relevant to the notion of ‘acting from’ principles of 
justice, then we quickly descend into this species of counter-intuitive, ‘just’ behaviours.  
Cohen provides a more detailed specification of the impact ‘acting from’ the 
Rawlsian difference principle might conceivably have on individuals’ productive decisions. 
Where individuals are suitably motivated to comply with the principles of justice, Cohen 
argues that both the additional incentives and inequalities that are their consequence – 
those Rawls deems necessary and legitimate parts of getting the talented to work more 
productively for the benefit of the worst off – would in fact end up producing a certain 
amount of injustice, precisely because it is a situation that involves submitting to the 
demands of individuals failing to ‘act from’ those principles of justice. Individuals properly 
motivated by the dictates of the difference principle would not require those additional 
incentives. They are bargaining with the marketable talents afforded by genetic contingency 
and fortunate circumstance in a way that interferes with the motivation to comply with 
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justice.  Where that motivation is properly held such incentives would not be required and a 
great deal more material equality between people would be the consequence.     
Cohen’s argument draws its force from a particular form of ‘justificatory community’ 
which he claims would exist between members of a just society:  
“A justificatory community is a set of people among whom there prevails a norm 
(which need not always be satisfied) of comprehensive justification. If what certain 
people are disposed to do when a policy is in force is part of the justification of that 
policy, it is considered appropriate to ask them to justify the relevant behavior, and 
it detracts from justificatory community when they cannot do so”.8 
When individuals whose talents have the ability to command a high market price 
demand additional money to use those talents productively – and thus for the betterment 
of the worst off – they act, according to Cohen, in ways that cannot be justified to the other 
party and thereby break the community of which that justification forms a part. Policies that 
allow for the use of incentives do so, according to Cohen, against the commands of justice 
as specified by the difference principle: It is only when high-talent individuals act unjustly 
that incentives such as these are required.9 Where they are instead motivated by what 
Cohen calls the ‘egalitarian ethos’, they act according to one of the demands of justice (as 
specified by the difference principle) without requiring additional pecuniary incentives to do 
so: The bettering of the position of the worst off provides reason enough.  
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 Cohen, Rescuing justice and equality, p 43 – 44. 
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 Note that this kind of incentives does not include appeal to the ‘special burden’ case where work is 
particularly stressful or arduous. Cohen himself suggests that his opposition ‘retires’ in the face of such cases. 
Ibid, pp. 55 – 56. I would suggest this ‘special burden’ actually deals with Titelbaum’s example of the individual 
who receives additional money to pay the commuting costs from her preferred place of living to a working 
environment where she will most benefit the worst-off. This need not be classed as incentive but rather as a 
special cost being covered. See Michael Titelbaum, ‘What would a Rawlsian ethos of Justice look like?’, p 318.  
While neither Cohen nor Rawls neglect to account for the individual behaviours that 
are necessary for the institution of justice, it is Cohen’s use of ‘justificatory community’ that 
renders those behaviours a less marginal part of his overall understanding of justice. Again, I 
remain agnostic as to the primacy of the institutions in formulations of ideal justice: The 
justificatory community and the decisions to which it will be applied are only an aspect of 
justice, not its totality nor even necessarily its greater part.  
Expanding the meaning of Community 
There are a number of grounds for accepting the demands of justificatory community. For 
example, there is the kind of solidarity at work in Cohen’s communal camping trip 
considered below: We justify our actions to others because we see our fates as in some way 
combined, the role of brother’s keeper extended beyond the boundaries established by 
familial ties. There is also a thinner, contractualist understanding of community that can be 
derived from a particular understanding of reasonableness. As T.M. Scanlon states it;  ‘when 
we address our minds to a question of right and wrong, what we are trying to decide is, first 
and foremost, whether certain principles are ones that no one, if suitably motivated, could 
reasonably reject’.10 It is a concern to be reasonable in our interactions with others that 
motivate this desire to justify ourselves to them.  
When Rawls stipulates the need for individuals to ‘act from’ the principles of justice 
in the normal course of events, he need not draw on anything as thick as the affective ties of 
solidarity or feelings of combined fates. Rather, he could similarly be described as specifying 
the kinds of behaviours appropriate to individuals who are ‘suitably motivated’ to act in 
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ways that they could justify to others in light of the profound contingency and good fortune 
they may have accrued in the genetic and social lotteries. 
This notion of ‘justificatory community’ thus provides a possible means of 
developing the Rawlsian ‘sense of justice’ to include reference to a set of demands that go 
beyond our conduct at the ballot box. Cohen’s arguments are thus important for raising an 
area of ambiguity within Rawls’ theory, specifically regarding what it means for people to 
‘act from’ principles of justice as a part of their ‘normally effective sense of justice’.  
However, there are resources within Cohen’s notion of ‘justificatory community’ – 
employed as a means to challenge Rawls – which, ironically, offer profound qualifications to 
the force of his egalitarian ethos. Both the wider understanding of community and the more 
narrowly defined justificatory community he employs, resist the notion that maximal 
productivity – as directed by the difference principle – should be that which has such an 
overbearing hold over how we relate to one another. 
There are different reasons and motivations informing our relations to one another 
that would operate within a just society besides those which can be captured by the 
egalitarian ethos. To have it otherwise would mean, perversely, flattening complex 
understandings of community in the name of justice: For justice to prevail, so Cohen’s 
position would seem to have it, our obligations and relations to one another should be 
derived primarily from how much we can benefit the worst off with our productive 
endeavours: Where we can work hard to produce for the position of the worst off, this is 
what we must do – nothing less than justice demands it.  
Elsewhere however, Cohen’s discussion of the values represented by a camping trip 
suggests that he himself would not embrace such a flattening out.11 Indeed, it is because the 
trip works well as an example of community that it is useful as a means of expanding 
Cohen’s particular account of a ‘justificatory community’. It is via this expansion that we 
gain a better sense of the ethos appropriate to ideal circumstances. Moreover, it is via 
contrast with this fuller, ideal account of community that we gain insight into the different 
kinds of ethos appropriate to circumstances when such community is lacking, which in turn 
provides us with the means of better understanding those demands of assistance that are 
also part of people’s ‘effective sense of justice’.   
Cohen uses the camping expedition to exemplify an ideal form of community. People 
come together, pool their property with that of others and share an understanding about 
who is to use what equipment, when and why – all with the aim of ensuring each member 
has as “good a time” as possible. The good time the individual campers hope to have is thus 
predicated on their being able to provide the means – through their skills, property and 
effort – for others in the community to have a similarly good time. Indeed, Rawls’ 
interpretation of the difference principle as one of fraternity is intended to produce a similar 
situation – that is, it is only when one is able to gain as a consequence of others similarly 
gaining, that one wishes to gain at all.12 
Now, imagine Harry – the expedition’s exceptional fisher – is especially close to one 
of the other members of the group, Jill, who falls ill. Harry, while perfectly competent as a 
carer, is not the most qualified member of the group in fulfilling the relevant functions of 
that position. In addition, while Harry is caring he is not able to catch the group’s fish for 
                                                          
11
 
11
 G.A. Cohen, Why not Socialism?, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009) pp. 3 – 45.  
12
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p 90. 
them.13 According to Cohen’s egalitarian ethos – which demands that where individuals are 
suitably motivated by concern for others they should choose the job that is most productive 
from the point of view of those others – Harry should continue to fish. It is via the fish he 
catches that Harry is able to properly embody the egalitarian ethos and answer to the 
demands of justice.     
If the egalitarian ethos was all community amounted to then Harry should thus get 
back to the fishing pond and let more qualified members of the group attend to Jill. 
However, this demand should strike us as reducing too heavily the plurality of meanings 
represented by community: Community has far more dimensions than this single ethos can 
hope to capture. Our relations to one another cannot be boiled down to this merely 
productive function. Moreover, when I discuss non-ideal circumstances below, an over-
emphasis on the productive dimension of community generates effects that are wholly 
detrimental to the pursuit of (more) justice. 
There are two reasons to think that Harry is entitled to attend to Jill even where the 
fish stock might be reduced somewhat or Jill might not receive the most professional of care. 
First, care itself is a complex good. Jill might be deeply offended by Harry’s following the 
egalitarian ethos and heading off to fish instead of caring for her. To define care strictly 
according to professional competence is to miss the deeply human connections that are 
constituted and sustained by having it performed by people with whom one already has 
affective involvement. While others in the group might be able to suppress a fever or heal a 
wound as if by magic, Harry’s less effective remedies might still be appreciated in light of 
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their shared affective bonds.14 Efficiency can remain an important aspect of care but it is 
important to appreciate the importance of the source of its provision and the complexity 
this introduces when measuring its ‘efficacy’. 
Secondly, as Cohen himself recognised, efficiency is a matter of considering all the 
values we have reason to preserve.15 If there are others who can catch sufficient fish, even 
though they might not be of the same quality or quantity as previously caught by Harry, 
then the community might make the collective decision that the value of the care Harry 
provides to Jill is an all things considered better state of affairs than would hold under a 
situation where Harry takes care of the fishing but the care Jill receives lacks the deep 
personal involvement Harry could provide. This might seem like a ‘thought too far’: Must 
Harry really first consult the community before he is able to engage in the care he wishes to 
provide Jill? Does this not also put the quality of that care in question?  
While Harry is allowed to follow his personal prerogative to tend to Jill, there 
nevertheless should remain a tension between the identification he has with the community: 
That is, if it is to be more than simply rhetoric this identification will inevitably conflict with 
other of his identifications. The additional thought is therefore appropriate – if the wider 
community is a concern for Harry, there should remain a tension between the different sites 
of his obligations. We have only so much time and energy to give and particular 
identifications may demand so much of us that others, regrettably, fall by the wayside. By 
tending to Jill, both their personal prerogatives – to care and be cared for – have come to 
replace prerogatives that would, in other circumstances, have been directed toward the 
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wider community. The question remains as to whether they are able to justify this to their 
fellow-community members, whether they are permitted to identify more with their 
pressing personal prerogative than with those other community demands.      
This last response relates to a wider point. Although Harry is less productive in the 
world where he looks after Jill this does not mean that he will necessarily suffer from 
atrophy of the kinds of motivation that are appropriate to justice.16 It is rather that other 
motivations come into conflict with them, making them difficult to act on. Community is still 
there as part of Harry’s concerns, but there is not the time or energy available for him to act 
fully in accordance with what that concern would, in other situations, require of him. 
Difficult decisions thus have to be made about what to do with his finite resources of time 
and effort. 
We can determine whether Harry’s siding with his personal prerogative over the 
other motivations is justified by looking at how Harry could justify that decision to other 
members of his community.17 An alternative means of justifying such ‘siding’ could be to 
look at the lexical priority of certain goods, as stipulated by Rawls’ other principles of justice. 
So, for example, if Harry had a particularly strong preference for a job other than fishing he 
could perhaps justify taking this job to other members of the community in light of the 
priority enjoyed by occupational choice, notwithstanding the demand to produce for the 
benefit of the worst off.  
Turning to Cohen’s use of the ‘justificatory community’, we can ask if Harry is able to 
justify his concern with taking care of Jill to the rest of the community, even with the drop of 
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 Cohen also recognises the need to strike a balance in light of this tension. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and 
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fish i.e. reduced productivity, that it would precipitate? In any community where bonds 
between individuals stretch beyond concern with the merely productivist drive that is 
represented by the egalitarian ethos – and where they recognise the importance of personal, 
affective ties to the concept of care – I suggest such justification can almost certainly be 
entertained. Indeed, where it is not we have to wonder what kind of community in fact 
holds between these people where the only reasons permitted are those pertaining to 
productive ability.  
Indeed, from Cohen’s own allusions to personal-prerogatives, it is plausible to 
suggest that there remain quite considerable reasons Harry can draw on to justify his 
decision to tend to Jill and reduce his productivity.18 To imagine otherwise reduces the 
meaning of community and, moreover, places those worst off in the position of overbearing 
patients who lack the ability to be appealed to in terms of reasons that pertain to things 
other than their welfare: To be in community with others is to be egalitarian which in turn is 
to be productive. Community is thereby reduced to a one way-street of provision and 
receipt.  
What Cohen does not adequately address are the ways in which the mutual 
justification of personal prerogatives can itself be an expression of community. People who 
work hard for the benefit of the worst off are expressing a concern for their community. In 
addition, the worst-off in a community who could perhaps benefit considerably from the 
talented working at maximal productivity, choose instead to permit the use of personal 
prerogatives similar to those Harry employs, are also acting in ways that express community. 
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They recognise the needs and prerogatives of other members of the community and allow 
their own welfare to be, marginally, affected. This aspect of community within the act of 
justification is missing from Cohen’s contribution.  
Having said all this, Cohen’s account of the egalitarian ethos nevertheless recognises 
an important tension between decisions made in the name of other, important personal 
goods and decisions made to maximally improve the condition of the worst off. Other costs 
– such as the ‘cost’ involved in forsaking a Porsche to allow other members of the 
community to benefit from what that additional money could provide – might not register 
with those to whom justification is owed. The exercise of productive-latitude as a means of 
driving up the pecuniary incentives associated with a particular occupation is not 
appropriate behaviour for those suitably motivated by the principles of justice. Massively 
increased opportunities for luxury consumption remain unprotected by the lexical priority 
afforded certain other goods.19 
Political Solidarity and Assistance 
In effect, the example of the camping trip develops the idea of mutual justification which, in 
turn, fills out the kinds of behaviours, motivations and decisions appropriate to citizens who 
care about and are motivated by justice. Via his explication of the egalitarian ethos, Cohen 
elaborates one of the motivations by which citizens of the just society will be moved: 
Producing for the benefit of the worst off, as a principle of justice to be acted ‘from’, 
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remains a consideration – amongst competing others – which appropriately motivated 
citizens should entertain.20   
With Cohen’s criticisms in mind then, it would remain, for example, totally 
inappropriate for Harry to use his concern for Jill to bargain with others to induce (‘naked’)21 
inequality-producing incentives that get him to fish for reasons that do not pertain to her 
care but are rather intended for the expanded consumption possibilities which these 
incentives would provide.22 However, what remains absent from Cohen’s expansion is a 
detailed specification different ways in which productive latitude can be justified to a 
community.23 By filling out the meaning of ‘justificatory community’ we have gained a fuller 
sense of the ethos appropriate to justice which includes more than producing to the best of 
one’s ability. 
However, if a just basic structure and an ethos appropriate to the sustaining of that 
structure, as well as the principles that ground it, are things we one day hope to achieve, it 
will be as a consequence of the motives, decisions and activities of people in non-ideal 
circumstances.  The question remains, however, about how to achieve and motivate that 
movement from non-ideal to (more) ideal circumstances. Interestingly, the ways in which an 
ideal ethos changes to accommodate the different demands of non-ideal circumstances 
offers a potential route toward (more) justice. It is by considering what happens in response 
of those people – or groups of people – lacking ‘suitable motivation’ to justify their actions 
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to others, that we gain a sense of what actions are necessary from the point of view of 
justice.24 
This lack of ‘suitable motivation’ produces part of the non-ideal conditions I consider 
for the remainder of this paper. There might be one group of people who, suitably 
motivated to justify their actions, nevertheless fail to collectively produce a situation of 
justice because of another group of people lacking that motivation. Now, the denial of 
justificatory community per se may not necessarily produce a situation of especially 
substantial injustice. Whatever we think about those people who refuse to work, so long as 
they are a small enough group of people, their (potential) lack of ability to justify this 
decision to others might be a cost society can reasonably afford. In any event, it does not 
necessarily mean those who are suitably motivated need change their behaviours.25 
However, when the group of people lacking that ‘suitable motivation’ also combines 
to affect certain large scale organisational and structural consequences, this changes the 
kinds of demands that are made of people who remain moved by principles of justice. When 
confronted with an absence of ‘suitable motivation’, when, in other words, people do not 
conform to this notion of reasonableness, there is something additional being denied: 
solidarity. 
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Whatever the grounds of ‘justificatory community’ with others might be, the denial 
of such community is always more than the denial of reasonableness. It is also a denial that 
these others are owed solidarity, that the concerns of the denied group warrant any 
significant consideration in the decisions and actions performed by the deniers. This point is 
crucial to the development of the notion of ‘assistance’ I develop below. 
It is this fact, that a denial of justificatory community is simultaneously a denial of 
solidarity, which provides an important reference point for those wishing to combat such 
denials. Those who remain motivated by concerns of justice in non-ideal conditions do not 
get unreasonable. Rather what develops in place of the expansive justificatory community is 
a more limited, oppositional variety of solidarity. If certain individuals act out of community 
with owed others, then those others will take action necessary to resist the kinds of unjust 
consequences those others would seek to institute as permanent features of the world. 
Being ‘out of community’ with others is to fail to be appropriately motivated by the 
principles and demands of justice. It is a failure to feel that tension between, on the one 
hand, the decisions made and their reasons for action, and, on the other, the fate of others 
in the community. This is a situation that fails to meet the conditions that would make an 
ideal ethos appropriate: We are thus in the realm of non-ideal theory. In such a situation, 
we cannot assume that simply because a just basic structure coupled with a just ethos 
describes justice in ideal circumstances that we can merely transpose that same ethos onto 
a situation that fails even to approximate ideal circumstances. Where Harry and others like 
him do act like – to use Cohen’s term – ‘schmucks’, what responses are available to the rest 
of the community who suffer the costs of that indifference?   
In what follows, I describe an alternative ethos, one appropriate to situations 
characterised by possibly profound injustice. I consider the ways in which solidarity 
becomes a necessary and important political virtue under non-ideal conditions. The appeal 
to reasonableness as the grounds of ideal justificatory community is precisely to avoid 
drawing on ‘ties of sentiment and feeling which it is unrealistic to expect between members 
of the wider society’.26 Solidarity or fraternity – which I use interchangeably – are too 
demanding as concepts, prescribing too much in the way of how to regard others and 
organise one’s emotional and practical life, to capture the kinds of demands that can be 
legitimately made of people in the name of justice. 
As a consequence of the desire to avoid this substantive concept, fraternity takes an 
especially productivist bent within ideal circumstances. So, for example, Rawls regards the 
difference principle, which is concerned with citizens’ productive decisions – what work they 
decide to do, how hard they decide to work – as a principle of fraternity.27 Even under the 
revised and expanded vision of an ethos appropriate to ideal circumstances, expressions of 
solidarity/fraternity with the wider-community are still made via decisions of how much to 
produce. The revisions merely supply the means to extend the reasons for which people can 
exercise productive latitude. This makes sense: Under just institutions the most effective 
way to contribute to the public good is by providing products or services people value. To 
ask that people develop additional ties of sentiment to members of the wider-community is 
to make overbearing, perfectionist demands that interfere with people’s emotional and 
affective lives: We are being told to feel a certain way about people and adopt certain relationships 
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with them which we might have other reasons not to endorse. The notion of community cannot 
legitimately stretch this far. 
However, within non-ideal circumstances – such as those we live with today –
solidarity, as the development of a specific kind of relationship between people, gains 
particular instrumental importance, notwithstanding the ‘thickness’ or perfectionist impulse 
implied by that concept. When we consider the actions of individuals who deny the 
legitimacy of having to justify their actions to a community – or else simply fail to do so –
where neither reasonableness nor solidarity figure prominently in their motivations, this 
latter concept will have to take a different form for those who are concerned with justice. 
  For example, when one group of people start to move their money abroad to avoid 
paying tax (legally or otherwise), governments will be tempted to lower the tax rates to 
keep this group’s money within the reach of the state, reducing social spending as a 
consequence. Others who retain the ‘suitable motivation’ to justify their actions might still 
be willing, counterfactually, to be taxed to a far greater extent than is presently the case. 
However, whatever action they now take – voluntarily giving money to the treasury for 
example – is, however commendable, unlikely to produce a situation approximate to justice. 
The effects of ‘acting from ‘their particular motivations are swamped by the effects 
produced by others’ motivations. It is the structures themselves which must change. 
Unfortunately, working hard and being willing, even though un-coerced, to distribute one’s 
earnings cannot achieve that.     
When confronted with the behaviour of citizens who are unconcerned with the 
justifiability of their decisions and actions, the costs and nature of assistance shift radically. 
Exactly what form those costs will take is a difficult and complex task without ready-made 
answers. However, a particularly important part of any such assistance is the development 
of solidarity with other members of a community who are suitably motivated to assume 
those costs and thereby resist the consequences affected by that other set of individuals.  
While the form and details are hard to spell out in the abstract, it is nevertheless 
possible to describe some of the main tenets that this different kind of solidarity will take. 
What Sally Scholz has distinguished as ‘political solidarity’ can be described as exclusionary, 
oppositional and intentional.28 An exhaustive typology of the different forms of solidarity is 
not important for the current purposes of this paper. Nevertheless, contrasting the political 
variant with another species of solidarity will help illustrate both the important instrumental 
function of this particular variant and the differences between it and the demands of the 
ideal ethos.  
What David Kahane has called ‘civic solidarity’ might refer to the relationships 
between citizens in a political state.29  The welfare state is intended as a particular 
expression of this form of solidarity: It organises and entrenches in laws the obligations 
citizens have to one another by ensuring that their basic needs are secured.  This notion of 
solidarity is both expansive in that it includes all people within a particular state or political 
community, but is also exclusive – in its current form, at least – in that there are people who 
are not members of such communities and who therefore lack entitlement.30 
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solidarity.31        
 Costs of Assistance 
Without solidarity between people experiencing/perceiving injustice, it is unlikely for a 
situation to become more just. Part of this justice is precisely the building and preserving of 
those other kinds of solidarity we have reason to value – such as the civil variant exemplified 
by the welfare state. Political solidarity might ultimately be inappropriate/unnecessary in 
ideal circumstances because, quite conceivably, the situations which give rise to it – namely, 
injustice and oppression – have been done away with. But the Rawlsian caveat that citizens 
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are somehow excused from assisting in the establishment of just institutions should the 
costs be too high is made untenable in light of the gap between the actual world and an 
even remotely just one, and the tremendous effort it will take to bridge that gap.  
Where people’s preferences do not line up with the demands of political solidarity – 
where we can therefore uncomplicatedly say people involving themselves in such struggles 
would prove ‘costly’ – this does not then mean that to ignore such costs is to be uninvolved 
in producing and sustaining situations of injustice. These are the costs of assistance Rawls 
alludes to when he describes his ‘normally effective sense of justice’: Where injustice exists, 
the activity appropriate to ideal circumstances which requires only compliance, is rendered 
inadequate – what is the point of sustaining injustice? – and ‘assistance’ must come to 
supplement compliant behaviours or, in instances of extreme injustice, altogether replace 
them.    
The ‘assistance’ generated by political solidarity require the development of certain 
practical skills and capacities if that solidarity is to prove effective. Tommie Shelby’s 
description of solidarity is useful as a way of highlighting its practical aspects.32 Shelby 
highlights five dimensions that are crucial for developing solidarity: identification with the 
group; special concern (‘a disposition to assist and comfort those with whom one identifies’); 
shared values or goals, and loyalty and mutual trust. With the possible exception of the first, 
these aspects of solidarity are more than merely passive expressions. Rather, depending on 
how deeply people engage with organisations that result from solidarity, they necessarily 
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involve a certain perfectionist constraint, supplying norms that will define who a person is, 
what she does and even how she feels.     
When someone is in need, for example, the expression of special concern implies we 
are in a position for that person to approach us and ask for assistance. This involves publicity 
of some kind, letting fellow-members know we have such concern and proving we are 
capable enough to assist. Shared goals and values, where they are not readily apparent, 
require articulation in order to be properly identified with. This is itself a complex process 
fraught with difficulty and potentially fierce disagreement. After articulation, values and 
goals also require translating into effective demands and action that can be brought to bear 
against those in power through a variety of means – this is also subject to disagreement and 
contestation. Beyond the tasks of articulation, it is also a job for effective leaders of such 
movements – in communication with its other members – to ‘first champion this turbulent 
insurgency and then channel it into a set of well-consolidated laws, institutions, and 
bargaining arrangements that can last a generation or more’.33   
The development of these skills is crucial for the creation of the oppositional 
dimension that is an aspect of this form of solidarity. Individuals or groups who are 
unconcerned with ideas of ‘justificatory community’ are called to account, and their desire 
that business should go on as usual is resisted. This solidarity is thus guided by an 
adversarial disposition, a notion of ‘us’ against ‘them’ in which disruption, withdrawal and 
more general interference with contemporary productive, political and social practices is 
both legitimate and necessary.  
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This solidarity can take the form of law-breaking, striking, direct action and, in 
extreme cases, sabotage and violent insurrection. Such action remains limited by the 
Rawlsian stipulation that it should assist the development of just institutions.34 Violence per 
se – even that which is perhaps understandable from the perspective of reactive or vengeful 
anger – that is not instrumentally guided by this limit is unjustified.35 Indeed, in response to 
Malcolm X’s pronouncement that ‘non-violence is fine so long as it works’, we can add that 
the recourse to violence also assumes that it ‘work’ for the establishment of justice for it to 
be legitimate. 36 Where violent might be wholly illegitimate when viewed from ideal 
conditions, this oppositional activity becomes desirable and perhaps necessary when 
conditions are unbearable.37  
Timothy B. Tyson’s account of the reaction initiated by certain members of the 
African-American community to a blatant miscarriage of justice in North Carolina is 
interesting on this score. The failure of an all-white jury to convict a man for the murder of 
Henry Marrow galvanised the local African American community, leading to coercively 
enforced boycotts – in which citizens who broke the boycott had their property broken or 
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confiscated38 – alongside the actions of more radical African Americans in the local area who 
organised strategic and large scale fire-bombings throughout the community, thereby 
putting significant pressure onto – and fear into – the white section of the population,.39 As 
Tyson sums up this collective reaction: ‘It had taken the physical threat of “Black Power” to 
make the moral argument of civil rights mean anything on a local level”. 40 Another way of 
putting this is that the threat – and use – of violence was organised and guided by the 
demand that the local ‘justificatory community’ be expanded to include those owed equal 
membership.41 
In this example, African-Americans suffering from the yoke of racism 
certainly can justify their actions to the community according to the duty of assistance and 
the principles which motivate that duty – howsoever this interpretation might be refused or 
rejected by those people acting out of community with them. The purpose of their action, 
however, is no longer directed at justification: It is rather to force those individuals and 
groups – via proportionate and effective means – to stop acting in ways that cannot be 
justified to the wider community.   
Importantly, where people are uninvolved with practices of political solidarity they 
are not only avoiding the costs of assistance. By continuing to produce in unjust 
circumstances – maximally or otherwise – individuals are also involved in reproducing 
injustice: Producing and consuming goods that are possibly steeped in exploitative practices 
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is to facilitate the persistence of those practices: The costs of injustice are always huge for 
someone.42 When Rawls fiercely suggests that ‘unjust social arrangements are themselves a 
kind of extortion, even violence, and consent to them does not bind’, we should be quick to 
remember that this lack of the ‘power to bind’ is small comfort to those who suffer from the 
ongoing existence of the arrangements.  
Were these practices to take place within ideal circumstances, i.e. where they could 
be justified to everybody implicated in them, they would sustain and reproduce justice. But 
the assumption that this demand can be simply transferred across the divide is to overlook 
the shift in affect such productivity generates. This shift also challenges the content – if not 
the concept – of over-demandingness described by Liam Murphy in his discussion of non-
ideal obligations.43 While he emphasises a choice confronted by a college graduate as one 
between taking a high-paying job or surfing – a situation in which Murphy believes the 
student is obliged to opt for the job – productivity cannot have this much hold on our efforts. 
Yes, the investment bankers might be paying more tax but they are still performing a 
sustaining function in a situation that needs to change its practices of production and 
distribution. By withdrawing altogether from production and consumption surfers might 
even be less damaging so far as the demands of justice are concerned.44 In non-ideal 
situations of minimal compliance, justice has to refer to more than simply working hard, 
even where (relatively) high-levels of tax can be accrued from those professions.  
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I have argued that there is a substantial difference between the kinds of ethos and 
actions appropriate to an ideal situation and those appropriate to non-ideal situations. The 
ethos appropriate to situations where the justificatory community is in full effect is going to 
be qualitatively different to circumstances where the task is to assist with the expansion of 
that community and the development of a situation designed according to just principles.45  
There is thus a different basis for the ethos here under examination: It is not 
expected that everyone in non-ideal situations will embrace the kinds of activity, 
motivations and demands here being described. The extent of my argument is that so long 
as we care about gaining more justice, the people who do entertain such an ethos are 
necessary from the perspective of justice, even though ultimately, they might be aiming at 
situations where such an ethos will be inappropriate. 
Conclusion 
I began the essay by expanding on the Rawlsian notion of a sense of justice. I did this first by 
agreeing, broadly, with Cohen’s expanding of the scope of justice to include a more 
demanding account of what is expected of individuals in order to support principles of 
justice. I then gave shape to the various qualifications to that ethos, qualifications both 
Cohen and Rawls could conceivably entertain, by developing Cohen’s notion of ‘justificatory 
community’. Consequently, what emerges from the interaction of these two thinkers 
provides a larger overall picture of the kinds of ethos appropriate to ideal conditions.  
However, while this fuller ethos and the community which gives rise to it might be 
suitable for ideal conditions, this ethos will differ significantly within non-ideal 
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circumstances, which I characterise as the failure of that motivation to hold for all those 
owed membership to the ‘justificatory community’. Where injustice is substantial a different 
ethos is required.  
The second part of this essay explored the effects of that shift between levels. 
Specifically, I focused on the ways in which solidarity – as ‘political solidarity’ – becomes 
more oppositional, disruptive and confrontational. This ethos underlines the ‘assistance’ 
part of Rawls’ ‘normally effective sense of justice’. Where we might hope to attain a 
situation where all we need do is comply with the principles that describe ideal justice, we 
are a long way from that situation as it stands. Developing an ethos for the demands of the 
here and now is a far more pressing matter than wondering as to what an ethos looks like 
against an already just set of institutional practices and with a population of suitably 
motivated citizens. 
 
 
